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The arguments given for the decline and fall of Rome are
many and varied. Two in particular have dominated the lit-
erature. One, supported by Max Weber, A.B.R. Boak and
others, contends that the transition from ancient civilization
to feudalism was due to the fall in supply of slaves and the
ramifications of that fallon the ability of other elements in
the system to be reproduced. A.H.M. Jones, A. Bernardi,
CM. Cipolla, and others have challenged this argument and have
offered an alternative which focuses on the economic limita-
tions of an agrarian based empire. The problem was manifest
in an exceedingly oppressive system of taxation which also
prevented system reproduction. These alternative arguments
are synthesized in this paper by employing Marx's concept of
reserve industrial army and explaining its operation with respect
to various rates of exploitation. The result is a step to a more
comprehensive explanation ofRome's decline and fall.
INTRODUCTION
In the German Ideology, Karl Marx outlines the funda-
mental stages of history. Beginning with tribal society Marx
proposes two lines of development; one was the ancient soci-
eties of Rome and Greece, and the other was the oriental soci-
eties of India arid' China. He then goes on to examine the' stage
of feudalism and the transition to capitalism. With certain
modifications, Weber implicitly incorporates Marx's outline in his
studies of the Protestant Ethic, Judaism, China, India, etc. Of
interest here is Weber's treatment of the transition from one
stage to the next, in particular, the transition from the Ancient
to the Feudal systems, which, interestingly enough, Marx omits.
Although Rome eventually had two distinct parts, it is the
Ancient society of Western Rome, as opposed to the Oriental
system of the East, that is the subject of analysis here.
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At the center of Weber's argument was the issue of social
reproduction; following his own historical studies, he concen-
trated upon the conditions for the reproduction of the slave-
slavemaster relationship. Briefly, it was Weber's contention that
the transition from Ancient civilization to Feudalism was due to
the fall in supply of slaves, and the ramifications consequent
upon the fall on the ability of other elements in that system
to' reproduce themselves. This argument could be referred to as
a "manpower shortage" argument, and is supported by other
scholars of Rome, notably, Arther E~ R. Boak, in Manpower
Shortage and the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West.
The manpower shortage argument however, has been chal-
lenged by some, including A.H.M. Jones, "Overtaxation and the
decline of the Roman Empire"; Aurelio Bernardi, "The Eco-
nomic Problems of the Roman Empire at the Time of its
Decline"; and Carlo M. Cipolla, The Economic Decline of Em-
pires. The main argument points to the economic limitations of
an agrarian based empire. The problem was manifested in an
exceedingly oppressive system of taxation which had severe
consequences for the internal organization and the military
defense of the state. The resulting semi-feudal system was in-
capable of supporting a large state.
It is the purpose of this analysis to show that the manpower
shortage and taxation "camps" are not contradictory argu-
ments, but can actually be merged to give a comprehensive and
chronologically accurate explanation of the fall of the Roman
Empire in the West. This will be done in the- following way.
First, notice of ~ the prevailing co~~itions,_. for the most p~
self-evident, will be made in order to set the stage. A number of
the items listed as initial conditions, although interesting and in
other contexts worthy of further examination, will be taken as
historical givens. Second, a description of the general state of
affairs will be given for dassical Rome (the early empire, cen-
turies one and two A.D.) and Decadent Rome (the later empire,
centuries three through five). Thus having discussed the historical
fact that the early Empire differed from the later Empire, an
argument will be proposed merging the manpower shortage and
taxation camps, which will explain the dynamics of the transition
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from Ancient to Early Feudal systems. The final result will be
a completion of the arguments of Weber, Cipolla, and others, as
well as providing a missing element of Marx's stages of history,
the transition from Ancient to Feudal society.!
PREVAILING CONDITIONS
In order to understand the process whereby the Empire
of Rome decayed it is important to know something about the
environment in which it was operating. Up until the' second
century A.D. Rome was decidedly expansionistic. Periodic
treasures flowed into the Empire; included in these treasures
was a vast number of slaves. Rome was principally expanding
into areas with high populations which were, significantly, similar
in social organization and composition to itself. Therefore, the
people enslaved were not merely unskilled, illiterate laborers,
but were in fact at least as skilled as the native Romans in a
variety of ways (Barrow, 1928; Gurowski, 1860; and Rostovt-
zeff, 1941).
By around the middle of the second century A.D., Roman
military expansion had ceased. Once beyond the band of dense-
ly populated coastal nations of the Mediterranean, the avail-
able number and the relative skill (in terms of Roman needs) of
the inhabitants reduced. Not only had the .quality and quantity
of the potential slave population been altered (Barrow, 1928),
but the present means of expansion did not adapt well to the
changes in geography and style of warfare of the natives (Lutt-
wak, 1979; Marsden, 1969 and 1971; Parker, 1958; and Thomp-
son, 1952). The military did not advance technologically, as
did not the per capita productive capacity of the Roman citi-
zenry in general.
To supplement its own technological level, Rome bor-
rowed heavily from the conquered provinces and even from the
barbarian frontierland. At its greatest extent, at the accession of
Hadrian in 117, the territory of the Roman Empire embraced
some 2,000,000 square miles and about 60,000,000 inhabitants-
men, women, children, free men and slaves included. The Empire
extended from the Euphrates River to the Atlantic, from the
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Sahara to the Rhine-Danube line, and most of Britain. The
army which conquered and defended this domain numbered
about 300,000 (Finley, 1970:85-86).
CLASSICAL ROME
Max Weber? defines three elements of the social struc-
ture of Antiquity. First, the civilization of Antiquity was es-
sentially urban in character. The city was the center of political
life, art, literature, and the economy. Second, the operation of
the ancient city was based on the exchange of its industrial
products for the agricultural products of its rural hinterland, an
exchange centered in the city's own market. The trade involved
was directly effected between producer and consumer, and es-
sentially covered all needs; near self-sufficiency was the rule.
What "international" trade did exist was limited primarily to
a small number of expensive articles, luxuries. Third, the civili-
zation of Antiquity was based upon slavery.
Because of the character of the chronic warfare of ancient
civilization, potential labor, in the form of human enslavement,
was abundantly available and, in Weber's words, cheap. The
result of this was that the free sector ceased to expand; the
crafts could not advance beyond the stage in which production
was wage work done for customers by non-propertied artisans.
Economic progress was manifest in the slave system by the
steady accumulation of workers; the more slaves assembled, the
more specialization of occupations was possible. Only slave-
owners then could develop production based on a division of
labor', and only they could improve their standard of living.
More and more it was slave enterprises which could produce for
both the needs of the master who lived in the city, and the needs
of an exchange economy in the city marketplace. Thus, autarkic
(self-sufficient) estates based on slave labor became the sole
dynamic of the economy of Antiquity, and the slave/landowner
became the dominant figure in the economy of Antiquity.
The conditions of life for the slave are of general interest
and particular importance in this analysis; therefore, a brief
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outline of slave life is offered. "The speaking tools" (instru-
mentum vocale) were typically managed by the barracks system.
Every aspect of the slave's life and every activity of the day was
regimented. Further, the barracks slave was without either
property or family. The significant element of this system
concerned the constant demand for barracks replenishment; the
barracks did not produce slaves. As Weber pointed out, "The
ancient plantation consumed slaves the way a modern blast
furnace consumes coal." Labor intensive operations were the
rule and there was no room for workers whose activities de-
tracted from their ability to produce. Hence, a slave market
regularly and amply supplied with human material was the
indispensable precondition for a barracks slave system engaged
in market production.
The state of the Roman Empire in the first and second
centuries was far from being a bureaucracy in the modern sense
of the word (Rostovtzeff, 1927). The imperial officials, often
paid in kind (Weber, 1978) were a mere superstructure added
to self-governing communities throughout the Empire. The
elective magistrates of these communities were the links that
connected the citizen with the state. They had the municipal
councils in Italy and the provinces had control over the town;
duties included tax collection, care of legal matters, and enforce-
ment of obligations such as making and maintaining roads.
In most cases, the agents of the central government merely
supervised the municipal authorities (Rostovtzeff, 1927).
The apparent self-sufficiency of the cities, and the rela-
tively frequent contributions of the military to the national
treasury created a situation in which the state did not have to
make oppressive demands on its population. Although the
military was already in the early stages of bureaucratization
and the soldiers were paid a salary, the practice of taking booty
after conquest did help defray its costs. The taxes which were
assessed were generally of four kinds, a land tax, cattle tax,
customs and duties, and a tax on the profits of any trade or
profession. In special cases the city might levy some additional
tax, but these were generally temporary in nature (Rostovtzeff,
1927).
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In summary, the picture of Classical Rome appears to in-
clude a relatively prosperous and smoothly operating system.
As long as the society received an abundance of slaves (its neces-
sary "fuel"), the system reproduced itself.
DECADENT ROME
The halt of expansion is the most obvious of differences.
Weber points to the abandonment of the wars of conquest on
the Rhine, a resolution later repeated on the Danube and Had-
rian's evacuation of Dacia. The entire area of ancient civiliza-
tion was now pacified internally and (to a large extent) exter-
nally (Weber, 1976:399).
Weber and others have noted that the most significant
resource to which Rome had less access was the slave. In re-
sponse, the barracks slave system of earlier times was replaced
by one in which the slave was reunited with family and prop-
erty and made a hereditary laborer of the estate-a serf.
With the change from barracks slave toward hereditary
serf also came a reduction in the rate of production on the
estates." This decrease in surplus market production, when com-
bined with the migration from the country to the city during
the prosperity of the first two centuries A.D., led to a clash of
forces-decreased rural production and an increased urban de-
mand (Bernardi, 1970:34-35).
Simultaneously, the Empire was still in need of a standing
, army. Once expansion halted and borders were established there
was a needto defend those borders.. A major contributor to the
'stability of the military was, the periodic influx of treasures
gained by conquest (Bernardi, 1970:32). Closely related to this
was a change in the traditional operation of the Roman military.
The change was from that of a service liturgically classified
according to property and fulfilled by self-equipped men as an
honorific privilege, to that of a state-equipped, "proletarian,"
bureaucratic army (or in other cases a mercenary army), the
costs of which were met by general taxation (Weber, 1978b).
As Weber has pointed out, due to massive accounting problems
associated with payment in kind, there are few exceptions to the
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rule that bureaucracies must be supported with money pay-
ments. Thus the growth of a bureaucratic army implies the need
for a fully developed money economy and a monetary taxation
system (Weber, 1978b); but imbalance of rural-urban produc-
tive and consumptive forces already had resulted in an urban
financial crisis (Bernardi, 1970:35).
Under the pretext that the towns were sunk in debt and
incapable of managing their finances, special commissions were
appointed by the Emperor to report on the facts; and from
Trajan's time permanent inspectors discharged this office, stead-
ily eclipsing the municipal authorities and reducing them to a
position in which they were responsible to the state for the
town and its territory, but entirely unable to act freely in town
affairs (Rostovtzeff, 1927:260). The growth of the bureaucracy
in the later Roman Empire further reduced the right of the
municipal self-government; now the main activity of every
social and economic center in the realm was interpreted as
service to the state (Rostovtzeff, 1927:327).
There was resistance to this increased bureaucratization
of the Empire, and it manifested itself in the growth of the
large estates. Through a sympathetic alliance of large landowners,
and high bureaucratic officials-themselves large landowners-
taxation was avoided, evaded, and in some cases, legal immunity
was granted (Bernardi, 1970:57-58). Due to these and other
factors, the large estates were increasingly removed from juris-
diction and more and more came to internally produce all that
they consumed. A "great number of rural properties beganto
appear alongside the cities as administrative units, and in these
holdings the landowners were the source of local authority.
Given the impoverished condition of the urban centers, the state
turned to the only remaining functional enterprise, the estate,
to satisfy its needs (Weber, 1976:401).
Urban activities declined further, leaving as vital elements
only those crucial to the state (Rostovtzeff, 1927:353). The
labor in these operations amounted to state serfdom. Others,
unable to bear the tax burden, sought the protection of the
estate lords. In return for protection the smaller landowners
became indebted to the lordsd; in effect, serfs (Bernardi, 1970:63).
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Thus, the entire population came under domination of some sort;
the history of the time indicates that most preferred escape from
cities to the estates.
As the estates became effectively self-sufficient the towns
deteriorated rapidly. The economy of the Empire had fallen and
the use of money was rare; yet the money needs of the military
continued to exist. Confiscation and payment in kind proved in-
adequate at best, and the eventual solution was the barbarization
of the legions (Bernardi, 1970:70-72). It was through these bar-
barian formations that the way was paved for the advent of the
Roman-barbarian kingdoms on the soil of the Empire (Ber-
nardi, 1970: 72).
SOCIAL STERILITY-WHY ROME
FAILED TO REPRODUCE ITSELF
In referring to social reproduction the emphasis is on the
capacity of a system to continuously maintain its constituent·
social structures and the interrelationships among those struc-
tures. In the case of Rome the following are examples of struc-
tures and relationships which were not continuously reproduced,
and thus were changed in form, operation, and contribution:
(1) a bureaucratic army which was supported by taxes and geared
towards defense as opposed to an honorific self-equipped army,
(2) cities which were administered as tax sources by agents of
the state bureaucracy as opposed to cities which were essentially
self-administered, and (3) an economy which depleted its money
reserves arid' had' 'forced people to seek refuge on the large self- '
sufficient .estates. as opposed to one based on the intensive use
of slaves and the circulation of goods between the urban centers
and the rural estates. That these changes took place is a matter
of historical fact; just how and why these changes took place is
the subject of the following two parts of this section.
As noted in the introduction, there appear to be two
relatively contrasting "camps" of explanation for the decline
of Rome. Both are used, but with certain important modifica-
tions, in the following to provide the explanation of why Rome
failed to reproduce itself. First, the manpower shortage and then
the taxation arguments are presented.
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THE RESERVE SLAVE ARMY
Consider the following quote from Vol. 1 of Capital, by
Marx:
Taking them as a whole, the general movements of wages are
exclusively regulated by the expansion and contraction of the
industrial cycle. They are, therefore, not determined by the
variations of the absolute number of working population, but
by the varying proportions in which the working class is divided
into active and reserve army, by the increase or diminution in
the relative amount of the surplus population, by the extent to
which it is now absorbed, now set free (1967 :637).
The relevance of this passage is recognized when the ques-
tion, "why is the size of the reserve industrial army related to
the level of wages?" is asked. The answer is cloaked in terms of
the rate of exploitation and how the rate operates, (a point
Weber missed due to his inability to handle social structure).
In capitalism the individual capitalist has an unambiguous
interest in getting as much production as he can out of each
worker for the lowest cost. The worker likewise has an unam-
biguous interest in supporting and reproducing himself and his
family. Given a condition in which there are other people,
presently unemployed (and the absence of unions), yet willing
and wanting to work-the reserve industrial army-and the condi-
tion that unemployment is -below Subsistence (i.e., the unem-
ployed cannot long survive), there arises a special type of rela-
tionship between the capitalist and the wage laborer which re-
sults in a maximal rate of exploitation for the capitalist.
The cost for the capitalist of replacing a worker unwilling
to produce at a maximum for subsistence wages is actually less
than zero. By replacing the unwilling worker with one willing
to work under the given conditions, the capitalist actually
saves, thus, as long as the interests of the parties remain consis-
tent, the rate of exploitation will reach, and be maintained at
a maximum. However, in times of relative prosperity when need
for labor increases, the relative size of the reserve industrial
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army decreases. Then the cost of replacing a worker increases,
(due to the competition for available labor) and thus the rate of
exploitation decreases.
In Rome there is an analogous structured process for the
slave-slavemaster relationship. During the years of expansion
slaves were available, cheap, and mobile (Barrow, 1928:120),
(i.e., they could fill nearly any job required). The slaveowner,
like the capitalist, had an unambiguous interest in getting the
most production per slave possible. The cost of replacing a slave
in the barracks system was equal to the cost of a new slave, and
the cost of new slaves in the early Empire was quite cheap.
Therefore, the costs to the slaveowner of "making an example"
of a low producing slave (a painful death through torture,
cruelty, etc., see Barrow, 1923) were low. Given this practice if
the slave (like the wage laborer) has an unambiguous interest in
his/her own self-preservation he/she will consequently produce
as much as possible in order to avoid being the next "example."
In short, the rate of coercive exploitation, given the existence
of a relatively large reserve slave army, is at a maximum.
Although he does not develop the argument to the point
which we have here, Marx does, earlier in Capital, make reference
to the condition of the slave in terms of exploitation. As the
following quote will show, Marx understood the situation of the
slave under conditions of a maximum rate of exploitation,
generated in part by a reserve army (although Marx does not
label it as such).
The ·slave-owner buys his labourer as he buys- his. horse. If he
loses his slave, he loses capital that can only be restored by new
outlay in the slave-mart. But the rice-grounds of Georgia, or the
swamps of the Mississippi may be fatally injurious to the human
constitution; but the waste of human life which the cultivation
of these districts necessitates, is not so great that it cannot be
repaired from the teeming preserves of Virginia and Kentucky.
Considerations of economy, moreover, which, under a natural
system, afford some security for human treatment by identify-
ing the master's interest with the slave's preservation, when
once trading in slaves is practised, become reasons for racking
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to the uttermost the toil of the slave; for, when his place can at
once be supplied from foreign preserves, the duration of his life
becomes a matter of less moment than its productiveness while
it lasts. It is accordingly a maxim of slave management, in
slave-importing countries, that the most effective economy is
that which takes out of the human chattel in the shortest space
of time the utmost amount of exertion it is capable of putting
forth (Marx, 1967:266).
Weber notes that the barracks slave system does not repro-
duce itself from within, slaves are replaced from without. He
then asks the question, "what would happen if the slave market
failed to make available an adequate quantity and quality of
slaves?" (Weber, 1976:397-398). This is just what happened (see
"Decadent Rome"), and its effect was similar to an increase in
the demand for labor in capitalist systems. Slaves, due simul-
taneously to their scarcity and value in the Empire, were granted
legal protections from slaveowners. Further, to each master the
cost of buying a new slave was much greater. Thus, the rate of
coercive exploitation for the slaveowner could not be maintained
at a maximum.
The response of the sIaveowners was to seek incentives to
maintain production (Barrow, 1928:121). This took the form of
reuniting the slave with family and property in the form of
hereditary serfs (Weber, 1976:400-401). However, the reduced
rate of coercive exploitation and the incentives reduced the rate
of surplus. Since the master initially produced for himself and his
household, the reduced rate of surplus was noticeable first',
according to Weber, in the amount of surplus available for
exchange in urban markets. The essential ingredient, money,
was not being recirculated. The bureaucratic army and adminis-
tration demanded payment in money, yet the production of
surplus goods which had facilitated the necessary circulation of
money was decreasing. Rome did not adjust, and in fact con-
tinued on in the same dead-end direction. It is at this point that
the taxation arguments of Cipolla, Bernardi, Jones, etc., supply
(with certain modifications) the concluding interpretation of
this examination of the fall of Rome.
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TAXATION AND COERCIVE EXPLOITATION
An important point to recall is that although the empire
was no longer expanding, the needs for military preparedness
and maintenance remained (Weber, 1976:405). The significant
point, however, is that the legions were no longer contributing
to their own maintenance by bringing in treasures from without
(Bernardi, 1970:32). This, when combined with the slowdown
of the exchange economy in the cities set definite limits on the
capacity of the Empire to reproduce itself.
The "solution" to the problem was an increased bureau-
cratization of the state, in which more effective management
of the present resources was the goal (see "Decadent Rome");
and a subsequent increase in the rate of taxation, in order to
support the military and the ever-growing bureaucracy. Like
the capitalist and the slavemaster the Roman state was in a
position in which its alternatives and interests were clear; or,
as conceptualized earlier, the state's alternatives and interests
were unambiguous. In order to maintain the present system,
the state had to get the most out of an increasingly limited set
of resources. Given the right of coercive taxation of the state,
the solution to the problem of production was to raise the
rate of coercive exploitation of available producers: in this case,
Rome's population. The form of coercive exploitation was in-
creased taxation.
The needs of the state and the productive capacity of the
population were moving in opposite directions. The people,
...like .the state, also. had an. unambiguous interest; it was manifest
in attempts to circumvent, or escape the coercive exploitation
of the state. As was the case, the brunt of the burden fell upon
the shoulders of the small and medium-sized landowners (Ros-
tovtzeff, 1927:315; Bernardi, 1970:48-51). At the same time
larger landowners, through their alliance with the bureaucracy
evaded taxation (see "Decadent Rome"). Eventually, the smaller
landowners and the burdened classes of the cities sought and re-
ceived the same type ofevasion through the institution of the pat-
rocinium; (the protection of the estates extended also to confis-
cation and mandatory military service) (Bernardi, 1970:69-70).
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The crucial operation here is the reduction of the rate of
coercive exploitation of the population by the state. It was not
that the state wasn't interested in maintaining or increasing the
present rate of coercive exploitation, but that due to certain
factors (not to be explained here, but including the lack of mili-
tary support of the bureaucracy's effort to tax due to occupation
with the frontiers), the exploited population was able to escape
state circumscription by seeking the protection and immunity
of the large estates. This incapacity of the state to circumscribe
a population is fundamental to the operation and reproduction
of the state (Willer, 1977).
Since the state could no longer meet its needs through
internal coercive exploitation, it again turned towards external
resources. In this case, it was the fateful barbarization of the
legions (Weber, 1976:407). But the "Empire" that was overrun
was not the same as the one of the Classical period. Classical
Rome had not been reproduced; the period of the final "fall"
was already into the first stages of Feudalism.
CONCLUSION
In the proper sequence the manpower shortage and taxa-
tion camps, with the certain modifications proposed, form a
more complete explanation of the decline of Rome in the West
than do either alone. The initial stimulus is explicable in terms
of the relative rates of coercive exploitation of the barracks
slave. As the reserve slave army dwindled in size and narrowed
in. comp.osition, there is reason to. infer that the rate of coercive
exploitation dropped. In turn, this led to a slowdown of surplus
production essential to a money economy. However, the needs
of the state remained, and in some respects increased.
The "solution" of the state was to increase the rate of
taxation of its citizens. However, this led to escape from the
domain of state taxation by movement to large estates. The
final migration of the population from the cities to the estates
was a migration from a system of higher to one of lower coer-
cive exploitation.
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This shift in coercive exploitation rates served to reduce the
overall economic base of the system from one of widespread
exchange economies, to one of isolated self-sufficient, natural
economies (Weber, 1976:409-411). Since these estates were
~ithdrawing from the urban economy they could not pay taxes
In money and thus could not support the bureaucratic army.
The decentralized nature of such an organization impeded
attempts by the state to maintain its size, structure, and opera-
tion. The standing army once composed of private landowners
who supplied their own equipment, which evolved into one
equipped by the state and recruited from the proletariat, now
relied in great part on recruitment of barbarians from the border
(Weber, 1976:405).
In summary, the preceding analysis has strived for, and
hopefully has accomplished, the combination and completion
of several apparently divergent modes of thought concerning the
"fall" of the Roman Empire in the West. The shortcomings in
Marx's stages of history were recognized in Weber's attempt
to focus on the transition of Ancient to Feudal systems. The
point of concern is social reproduction. In turn, Marxs' analysis
of the reserve industrial army led to the analysis of the relation
between the reserve slave army and the rate of coercive exploita-
tion. The proper understanding of this led to a re-evaluation of
the two main camps of thought concerning the fall of Rome-
manpower shortage and taxation. In both instances, the relative
rates of coercive exploitation reduced first in the case of the
reserve slave army, and second in the case of the tax exempt
estate lords. The result was .t4a:t the structures of Roman .sociery
which depended on the economy and consequently, the state and
military, failed to be reproduced. The resulting system was unlike
~he former. Ancient society was now in the first stages of Feudal-
ISm.
FOOTNOTES
1. Th: decline of ancient civilization can be seen from two perspectives
which are by no means mutually exclusive. Given that Rome in the
west did succumb to barbarian invasions, the success of the barbarians
could be seen (1) as a consequence of Rome's declining ability to defend
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itself, (2) as a consequence of increasing numbers and military sophis-
tication of barbarians or, (3) as a simultaneous consequence of both.
In fact there is very little evidence according to most sources concern-
ing changes in barbarian population and sophistication in warfare (see
Luttwak, 1979 ;Marsden, 1969 and 1971; Parker, 1958). In the absence
of that evidence, this paper can be seen as supportive of either the
first or third alternative above. Intertwined with the above alternatives
is the issue of the style of defensive strategy adopted by Rome at
various time periods. As Luttwak has pointed out, these strategies
varied in "cost effectiveness" with early strategies being cheaper than
later. An element of Luttwak's position is that earlier strategies sup-
pressed barbarian pressure by the use of client states but, as these
states were "used up" by the strategy, pressure directly upon Roman
forces increased. With that increase came an increase in costs of de-
fense. Clearly these costs did interact with the fiscal ability of Rome to
maintain any defense. However, a full consideration of the relations
between Luttwak's position and the points made here transcend the
limits of this paper. Finally, it is stressed that this paper is not an at-
tempt to be a complete analysis of the decline of the Roman Empire.
Rather, it is an attempt to bring some unity, and thus more under-
standing, to the process which brought about Rome's decline.
2. Unless otherwise noted, this description of classical Rome is para-
phrased from "Social Causes of Decline of Ancient Civilization,"
in Max Weber's, The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilization, (Lon-
don, 1976).
3. There has been much discussion on the relative contributions of slave
and freeman in the overall economy of the Roman Empire. General
consensus is that Rome was a slave society and any significant produc-
tion was carried on by slave's brought in from outside the Empire.
While some slaves were bred for offspring the relative low cost of
slaves in the marketplace made this a generally unprofitable. enter-
prise. Further, the "barracks" slave and "gang" production were
encouraged by these were favorable conditions. The position that a
change from "barracks" slave to hereditary serf resulted in a reduction
in production on the estates is based on an understanding of the slave
mode of production which does not encourage internal reproduction.
In fact, internal reproduction, which implies a change away from a
"barracks" system, would run in contradiction to a condition of ample
slave supply. For discussions of this and related topics on the slave
in the Roman Empire see, Ancient Rome at Work, by Paul-Louis
(1927); Ancient Slavery and Modem Ideology, by M.1. Finley (1980);
Slavery: A 'Comparative Perspective, edited by Robin W. Winks, (1972);
Greek and Roman Slavery, by Thomas Wiedemann, (1981); and Con-
querors and Slaves, by Keith Hopkins (1978).
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